November 13, 1974

The Inside Story of Rhodes Victory

It was supposed to be a test of old politics versus "new politics," and it was.  Only the partisan press did a lousy job of casting the characters.

James A.  Rhodes had been tagged early as an old war horse with "tired issues," whereas John J.  Gilligan was lauded as a young exponent of "social responsibility."

In the end it was Rhodes who used the techniques of new politics and the appeal of bread-and-butter issues to defeat Gilligan who relied entirely on the worn out political technique of smear.

How Rhodes engineered the most stunning upset of the recent election will be a textbook lesson for future candidates.

Through a combination of friendship and circumstances I discovered about a year ago that the Ohio Republican Party was studying its problems scientifically, using confidential opinion polling and computer analysis.  It was an interesting contrast to the traditional picture of political bosses making decisions in a smoke filled room.

Intrigued, I took pains to follow the strategy step by step.

It started when Kent McGeough, chairman of the Ohio Republican Party, ordered a survey of Ohio voters to determine which Republican was best known and best regarded.  Of some 20 names that were mentioned only one - Rhodes - scored high enough to seriously challenge Gilligan.

This posed a bit of a problem inasmuch as Rhodes had retired from politics somewhat bitterly when Republicans chose Robert Taft as U.S. Senatorial nominee in a primary contest.  Now, at age 65, Rhodes was enjoying his work as a commercial building developer.

Rhodes turned down the first requests to run for office again.  However, the survey numbers were heartening, and his younger aides who had followed him into exile were eager to return to the political arena.

This, and his own deep-seated drive to serve others, started Rhodes' political juices flowing.  Finally, he said yes.

A Rhodes characteristic that made him a great governor is that of surrounding himself with highly capable advisors.  As usual he now sought out experts to supplement his own competent staff.

First, he borrowed Jim Duerck, the highly professional press aide of U.S. Attorney General William Saxbe.  Then, Rhodes hired John Deardourff, partner in the political consulting firm of Bailey, Deardourff & Eyre, Inc.  It is interesting to note that Deardourff this election handled four Republican campaigns in tough states and all four won against long odds.

Deardourff's first move was to conduct an extensive public opinion poll among all elements of Ohio voters to find out what really concerned them, and how they viewed both gubernatorial candidates.

The results:

1. Voters were worried about the economy, school funding and high taxes.
2. They viewed Gilligan as arrogant, permissive and spend-thrift.
3. They viewed Rhodes as one with a common touch, concerned about jobs, and a good money manager.

"With this knowledge," said Deardourff, "our job was to hit hard on the basic issue, remind everyone of the tax surplus, underscore Governor Gilligan’s aloofness, and emphasize Governor Rhode's previous record of sound money management.

To accomplish these objectives, the Rhodes campaign committee set out to turn on Republican and Independent voters who threatened to stay home in huge numbers and to neutralize the Democrats in Cleveland, Akron and Youngstown.

GOP Chairman McGeough bought a little computer time to project a "victory model" for Rhodes and, hopefully, the rest of the Republican ticket.  On the basis of voter registration and past voting patterns a "target" for each county was established.  For example, Wayne County was expected to produce a 54.2 percent vote for Republican candidates, Summit 39.1 percent, Cuyahoga 38.7 percent, Ashland 61.2 percent, and Medina 65.1.  In Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) where it counted most, the final Rhodes vote was 40.1 percent.

A "quota award contest" was announced for county chairmen with silver trays and certificates for those counties that met or exceeded their targets.  The contest was broken down into three divisions: 12 large counties, 32 medium ones and 44 small counties.

Rhodes contacted GOP county chairmen throughout the state early and got first call on experienced local workers for his committee.  Each county had its own Rhodes committee with sub-chairmen for organization, women's activities, fund raising, youth, labor, and senior citizens.

The local committees were urged to conduct a massive telephone program to identify the undecided voters, send them literature, and then get the decided Republican voters to the polls by absentee ballot or shuttle cars.

The "voter education plan" is a copyrighted, here-to-fore confidential, technique developed during the Richard Nixon presidential campaigns.  It is given much credit for Nixon's landslide victory in 1970.  Those local Rhodes committees which used the survey plan this year declare it unusually effective.

Voter awareness of Rhodes' name, personality and record - which showed up in the initial, exploratory survey - allowed Rhodes to concentrate his campaign funds on defining the principal issues and attacking Gilligan's weaknesses.

Favorable name recognition enabled Rhodes to survive the Watergate problem which swamped most other Republicans.  It also permitted him to forego mass rallies and concentrate on fund raising affairs.  For this purpose he chartered a small plane and spent much of his time flying to places where audiences were small and contributions waiting.

Rhodes and his advisors knew the big daily papers in northeast Ohio would short-change him on space devoted to issues and criticism of Gilligan's record.  He decided, therefore, to bypass the print media with a television blitz.

For this, Deardourff fashioned a series of TV commercials now rated masterpieces by political observers.  The spots were concise and hard hitting.  They portrayed the human side of Rhodes, his record of accomplishment as a builder of roads and colleges, his concern for jobs for working men, and his reputation for getting things done with a minimum of taxes.

In contrast, Gilligan's television spots consisted entirely of essays on his compassion and of personal attacks on Rhodes.  According to the scripts, Rhodes would not publish his income tax records, would not debate, was guilty somehow of a "state house loan scandal", was negligent in sending the National Guard into Kent State University, and had used campaign funds for personal expenses twenty years ago.

In short, Gilligan television was either too lofty or too negative.

All of this planning and organization would have been of little value without the political know-how of Jim Rhodes himself.  His opponents like to call him a "huckster", but privately they admit he is a "campaigning fool" who walks his opponents to death.  He has the energy of a man 20 years younger.

Rhodes genuinely likes people, especially those the political commentators label the "common man."  He sympathizes with them because he was a 9-year-old boy when his coal miner father died.  Rhodes had to work his way up Horatio Alger style without benefit of a college education.  Consequently he has always been job conscious.

His concern for building jobs is derided by his critics, but it is an issue appreciated by labor, and blacks, and the middle class workers - the largest bloc of voters.

Rhodes steadfastly refused to be drawn into debates or into a defense of his alleged short comings.  As a political veteran he knows that to become defensive is to give away half your votes.  Gilligan, on the other hand, was a victim of his own short temper.  He replied to Rhodes' taunts of poor performance with mud slinging.  There is a basic difference between the two types of criticism.  The voters discerned it and rejected it.

Though Gilligan outspent Rhodes by about a third - largely with union money - Rhodes put most of his campaign funds into the big cities where union workers are concentrated.

As a result Rhodes got labor votes, or denied them to Gilligan.

And that's the name of the game.

Author: Lindsey Williams