September 14, 1977

Carter Sandbagging Canal Treaty

In diplomatic language they call it "fait accompli" - an accomplished act that is useless to try and change.

But I call it "sandbagging."

Both descriptions refer, of course, to President Jimmy Carter's newest Broadway production: "Signing The Panama Canal Treaty."

As a result of Carter's masterful manipulation of North American television and South American heads of state the debate no longer turns on whether we should give away the canal.  The canal is gone, for all practical purposes.

The only question now remaining is that of the President's accountability to U.S. citizens.

Sandbagging is an old American custom of stunning a victim while you lift his wallet or ship him off as an unwilling deck hand.  Politicians and poker players know the technique well.  Ronald Reagan and Senator Strom Thurmond can fuss and fume to their heart's content, but they have been out maneuvered.  Now that Carter has dramatized United States "fairness" to the world there is no way we can renege without destroying what is left of our so called foreign policy.

Normally treaties are negotiated and initialed pending ratification.  When, and if, the Senate approves there follows a grand signing ceremony.  The new process of presupposing Senate ratification, and putting it on the spot to deliver, has greatly angered nearly all Senators.  It is a brazen usurpation of legislative powers by the executive that may well doom the treaty.  Even those senators who support giving away the canal now will drag their feet in order to reassert their constitutional authority.

There is a certain amount of propaganda value in turning over the canal to Panama.  It is a magnanimous gesture during this period of history when gestures count.

The Panama Canal isn't all that important any more.  In fact, it may be a costly liability we would be well rid of.  Only 6 percent of U.S. goods now are shipped through the waterway, and only six small U.S. warships went through last year.  Our largest ships can not squeeze through the obsolete Panama Canal.  Guided missiles from planes and submarines have made the canal indefensive.

We should debate the canal controversy on the basis of realities, but we wrestle with shadows instead.

Carter tries to persuade us with two principal arguments: (1) it is our "moral duty" to rectify the imperial way we stole the canal 64 years ago, and (2) if we don't the Panamanians will blow up the facility.

Before we can make a moral judgment about past actions we have got to deal with Colombia's right to the canal.  It was this nation which had sovereignty over the isthmus at the time we helped foment a revolution to take by covert force what we could not obtain by open negotiation.  The people in the Colombian province of Panama were equal culprits with us in the affair.

What would we do if Colombia was to reassert its rights to the canal territory after we leave?

It is true that sabotage could easily plug up the canal.  But that is more likely to happen after we are gone.  Panama is ruled by a Marxist dictator, General Omar Torrijos Herrera.  Left wing radicals sparked riots in 1964 and threaten to destroy the canal if we don't turn it over immediately.

We have already seen in the Suez Canal what happens when a nation of radical politics gets its hands on an international waterway - chaos.  And Panama has gone through 53 revolutions in its short history.

Sooner or later nationalism will get in the way of free canal passage.  With Marxists in power, the most likely country to be denied use of the canal is the United States - and in all "fairness" we could not exert colonial force on little Panama.

Those opposing our giving up the canal likewise rely on two main arguments: (1) the waterway is ours by right, and (2) it is vital to our defense.

Certainly we have a contractual right "in perpetuity" to the canal.  We built it at great cost and hardship when all others had failed.  In doing so we transformed the pest hole of the world into a viable country.  We conferred many more benefits to the Panamanians than we selfishly received.

Contracts, however, change in value as conditions change.  It is good business to get out from under an agreement that no longer is as useful as it once was.  It is interesting that the original canal treaty gave the United States a strip of land which it could "possess and exercise as if it were the sovereign of the territory."

In the beginning the U.S was very careful to emphasize that the "as if" did not mean we had any real sovereign responsibilities.  We were afraid we would "get stuck" with taking care of the Panamanians forever.  The time has come to crawl through that "as if" loophole.

The strategic value of the canal has completely disappeared.  Intercontinental, nuclear missiles now dominate international relations.  Locks necessary to lift and lower ships are too small and too vulnerable.  One bomb dropped from a Piper Cub taking off from, say, Colombia could reduce the canal to a muddy ditch.

Significantly the new treaty gives the United States the right to build a new sea-level Panama Canal in the future, and requires Panamanian permission to build such a facility in any other country.  Also, we will raise the annual rent we pay from $2 million to $60 million and give Panama $345 million in aid in return for being allowed to operate the canal until the year 2000.

It is hard to understand why it should cost us so much to "give" something away.  If it makes sense to relinquish the Panama Canal, let us do it immediately without any strings to us or them.  If lingering commitments are necessary, then it probably is unwise to give up the canal.

Under the circumstances it seems best to postpone a final decision until our heads clear.

Author: Lindsey Williams