Partial Defense Is Affordable, Worthy

Scientists working on the strategic defense initiative (SDI, or star wars) lofted a tiny balloon into the stratosphere this week, then destroyed it with a "smart rocket" fired from the ground.  The demonstration undoubtedly heartened President Reagan and the American Heritage Foundation - while dismaying Greenpeace and the League of Women Voters.  The rocket was cheap and effective.

SDI is not as far-fetched and expensive as its critics contend.  There is an alternative to the current policy of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense, outlined the stupidity of MAD in a little noted speech last December to the Foreign Press Center at Washington, D.C.

"In the '60s and '70s the U.S. cut its budget for nuclear forces each year.  Today, total megatonage of the U.S. nuclear stockpile is one-fourth that of 1959.  Seventeen years ago we had one-third more nuclear warheads than today," said Weinberger.

"We thought we could reinforce Soviet restraint, and facilitate limits on offensive arms, by guaranteeing our own total vulnerability to a Soviet missile attack.  We unilaterally gave up all defense.

"Advocates of this policy reasoned that if the Soviets could easily strike American cities, they would have no incentive to deploy more missiles," Weinberger said.

"Improvements and additions to the Soviet missile force continue at a frightening pace, even though we have added SALT II restraints on top of SALT I agreements.

"We now confront precisely the condition the SALT process was intended to prevent!"

WORLD TRUSTED U.S.

It is interesting to note that in the first four years of the nuclear era, when the United States had a monopoly of atomic bombs, no one feared nuclear war.  Even the Soviets were at ease when they crushed Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and blockaded Berlin.

The whole world trusted America's restraint and peaceful intentions.  Everybody got jittery only after the bellicose Russians obtained the bomb.

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon, we spent $100 billion to defend ourselves against the communist boast to "bury" us.  The Russians rapidly ringed Moscow with anti-aircraft guns and underground shelters.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson thereafter adopted the odd theory that we were safe only if we had no defense whatsoever.

The Soviets, who angrily told us that "only defense is moral," were delighted with the startling, new policy.  The rushed to sign a "treaty" embodying the concept.

While we dismantled our defenses, the Soviets redoubled theirs.  Since the ABM treaty, Russia has spent more on defensive systems than on offensive systems -and the latter is massive.

DESTROY WEAPONS

SDI is based on a belief we should destroy weapons, not people.

To do this, the Pentagon proposes a "four-layer" defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).  These are the monsters which Reagan says should be abolished and which the Union of Concerned Scientists asserts could obliterate all life on earth.  Ballistic missiles are space weapons.  Their trajectory is largely through that void where only satellites and shuttles operate.  Thus we already have weapons in space, and defense against them must perforce take place in space.

The most desirable time to knock down an ICBM is during its first four minutes after launch.  Warheads, decoys and booster are all in one, big piece trailing a long plume of fire.  One hit here destroys 14 nuclear bombs.

It is this phase which presently challenges SDI.  How do you detect a launch 3,000 miles away, decide if it is lethal, is directed at you, fire a counter weapon and hit the target in less time than it takes to read this column?

Exotic weapons are required here, most of them involving laser "death rays."  Russia has tested a laser against an old satellite with disappointing results.  The problem is harnessing enough energy.

One method of energizing a laser would be to explode a small nuclear device in a tracking laser.  Before the whole unit is vaporized, laser rays would hit up to 45 targets.  This is the proposal which has SDI critics uptight.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

Practical problems of phase-one lasers are so formidable that it is not likely they ever will be deployed.  Ground-based smart rockets in Europe will have to suffice.

There are three other phases of ICBM flight, however, which are more vulnerable to "conventional" defense measures: separation, four minutes; mid-course, 20 minutes, and terminal, two minutes.

Chief among defensive devices already on the shelf for application in the mid-course and terminal phases are smart rockets, electromagnetic rail guns (top secret), steel nets and showers of gravel.

These work well at low cost.  Unfortunately they face the difficult task of finding, and homing on, a few warheads in a 50-mile cloud of decoys.

Decoys burn up in the first minute of descent through the atmosphere; but that leaves only one minute in which to render the remaining, lethal warheads harmless.

The bottleneck of a practical SDI is a giant computer capable of discerning warheads and guiding defensive devices.  The task of programming a super computer seems beyond present technology.

PARTIAL DEFENSE ENOUGH

SDI critics say a defensive system would be prohibitively expensive and would protect only a small percentage of people.

This week's demonstration indicates that a partial SDI system is affordable and effective.

The beautiful thing about an SDI program is that a partial defense is enough.  If the Soviets can not be certain of total destruction of our retaliatory ability, the advantages of a first-strike disappear.

We should keep in mind that SDI defends by assuring our ability to fight back.  The mere fact that we are developing and testing a defensive system is enough to hold the Soviets at bay.  SDI is less than perfect, but it will serve until the Soviets develop tactical nuclear weapons and, like us, discover that ballistic missiles are obsolete.

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