November 14, 1999

U.S. Cleveland Took Part in War's Greatest Hoax

U.S. Cleveland, historian and retired assistant postmaster at Punta Gorda, participated in the greatest hoax of World War II -- credited by Supreme Commander Gen. Dwight Eisenhower with saving the D-Day landing at Normandy.

So secret was the subterfuge, its contribution and code name "Bodyguard" was not revealed until 1974 -- 30 years after victory in Europe.

Bodyguard was a program to lead the Germans into believing the main invasion of Europe would be at Pas-de-Calais -- preceded by feints at Norway and the Balkans.  The actual thrust, of course, was aimed entirely at Normandy.

The deception involved creation of wireless-radio traffic typical of army buildups. Bodyguard had several parts, each with its own code name:

• "Fortitude South" included "Quicksilver," the radio deception to which Cleveland was attached. It concentrated on a Pas-de-Calais target.
• "Fortitude North" in Edinburgh, Scotland, was designed to simulate preparation for a Norway landing.
• "Zeppelin" in Northern Ireland pretended to be readying an expeditionary force to the Balkans.

The whole scenario of false radio chatter was written out in detail, along with date and time cues, by a team of writers. The directive was a large book eight inches thick.  Fortitude South was the most daring fabrication. Anthony Cave Brown, is author of " Bodyguard of Lies," the book that chronicled the operation.

He writes that the tiny cadre of radio operators set out to create not merely an army, but an "Army Group" consisting of 50 divisions and a million soldiers.

"There were two army groups assembling in southern and southwestern England," says Brown. "They were Montgomery's 21st and Bradley's 12th. The former would go to Normandy  on D-Day. The latter would go in when a beachhead was established.

"The Germans were to be led to believe a third force -- the First United States Army Group (FUSAG) -- was assembling in southeastern England to launch the main attack at Pas-de-Calais.

"If the Germans could be convinced of the existence of FUSAG, they might then believe that the Normandy invasion -- when it came -- was a diversion; and as they moved to reinforce Normandy, FUSAG would descend upon Pas-de-Calais.

"Hitler was already predisposed to believe that Pas-de-Calais -- the shortest distance from England -- would be the main point of attack. He had garrisoned the area with his 15th Army,  the strongest Nazi force in the west. It was the objective of Fortitude South to keep that force in place."

* * *

Cleveland in mid-1941 was drafted for "a year of military training." After Pearl Harbor, the year became "the duration plus six months."

He was trained as a radio operator/technician in the Armored Forces. In January 1943, he applied for Signal Corps Officer Candidate School.  He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in May.

His adventure began with assignment to the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion where he had charge of 20 radio crews of four men each.

"The 31-Oh-Third was created especially for Operation Fortitude," says Cleveland. "However, the officers and men being assembled at Fort Monmouth, N.J. in late 1943 didn't know this.

"Nucleus for the battalion was a Signal Company which had been organized only a few months when it `lost its mission.' The company consisted of teams of radio operators intended for the communication network along the Burma Road. When the Japanese closed this road, all plans were canceled." These officers and men then were assigned to the 3103rd. Immediately they started receiving troops from all over the United States and from other branches of service.

"Puzzled by this development, we consulted the `table of organization and equipment.' All we learned was that the unit would consist almost entirely of radio operators and radio officers. Equipment would include almost every type of radio apparatus used by the Army.

"One company was to have high-powered equipment such as used at corps, division and army headquarters. Another would have equipment peculiar to armored divisions. A third was to receive equipment typical of infantry divisions.

"None of the officers present in camp had any inkling of the mission for such an odd unit. Needless to say, rumors flew wildly.

"When the battalion commander and his staff arrived in mid-December, we learned they had been on POM leave (preparation for overseas movement). We who had been organizing the unit were then given 3-day or 7-day leaves, depending upon distance from home.

"An avalanche of equipment started arriving. We all scrambled to get it ready for shipment overseas to an undisclosed destination. We learned shortly before sailing it would be England.

"We sailed on the "Mauretania" which traveled alone in submarine-infested waters instead of in convoy, because of the ship's speed. That trip is a story of its own.

"Radio operators are trained to transmit dots and dashes with uniform spacing and to refrain from personal flourishes. However, many develop unique operating characteristics, or "fists."

"German radio intelligence teams were very good at recognizing these and could track an operator and his unit through many changes of frequency and call signs. For our deception to work, we had to sound exactly like the combat units we were to simulate.

"When we landed in England in January 1944, we set about identifying all our operators' peculiarities.  Then, we were given recordings of the operators' fists in units we were to replace.

"We matched our operators with the others, or trained ours to duplicate those we had no match for. We even had to keep track of which operators were assigned to which units so we could do it again later as needed.

"As combat elements moved into southern England and the staging area, we occupied their former camps. We kept the radio nets going as before, including maneuvers and practice  landings.

"We had to move around as they would have because the Germans also had direction-finders to locate our units. Messages were encrypted, but mostly with low-level devices we knew the Germans could 'break.'

"Our part of the FUSAG deception required us to set up fictitious units. Operator matching in this case was not necessary.

"Here, too, we went on `maneuvers' and practiced `beach landings' simply by setting up our radios on the beach and driving inland while the ships and landing craft supposedly moved around offshore.

"Entire armies, corps, and division -- right down to the infantry platoons -- were represented by illusionary radio networks.

"Our radio transmitters were built to slide under the tarpaulin covers of 2-ton trucks so we could move about without being recognized by spy planes.

"Deliberate security breaches were included for realism. Operators would seem to send personal messages back and forth, or a company commander might arrange to meet a neighboring commander at the Boar's Head on Saturday night.

"The classic `breach' was a regimental report concerning "a number of women, presumably unauthorized, in the baggage train. What are we going to do with them, take them to Calais?"

"False transmissions are an old trick, so these were accompanied by dummy installations constructed by movie studios of canvas, fiber board and inflatable rubber. Hundreds of rubber tanks, for example, were assembled near Ipswich and moved about each day by four men. One, real tank made tracks for the benefit of German overflights.

"To heighten the realism for German agents, stories were planted in local newspapers -- such as announcing a `dance' for FUSAG soldiers. Letters to the editor from cooperating clergy would complain about `disgusting condoms' in the vicinity of the FUSAG barracks.

"Our own double agents in occupied Europe fed corroborating, false information to their handlers at great personal risk. Several were discovered, tortured and killed.

"One of the neat tricks used after the Normandy landings was to continue practicing beach landings on England's east coast near Ipswich. This was by a `different' unit than the ones that had done this before the invasion.

"The Germans missed a bet here because the units we had been duplicating the day before the invasion were among the first troops ashore. If the Nazi interceptors had identified the unit at Ipswich a few hours before the real unit went ashore in Normandy, they might have smelled a rat.

"Our intent was to indicate that further beachhead landings were forthcoming. The Germans swallowed it hook, line, and sinker.

"We even fooled the American troops at Ipswich Air Base. When we went there to take advantage of their PX (post exchange), the resident soldiers told us about the rough bunch that had been camped there and went ashore with the first wave at Normandy.

"We were only a small part of the overall picture. Yet, it was a picture that could not afford a single flaw if it was to work.

"We succeeded beyond all expectation. Hitler was so sure of our scenario he kept his main force at Pas-de-Calais for two weeks while allied troops and equipment poured ashore at Normandy.

"I am proud to have played a small part in an operation that was credited with saving many lives and contributed substantially to victory," says Cleveland.

* * *

In General Eisenhower's official report at the end of the war, he stated: "Lack of infantry was the most important cause of the enemy's defeat in Normandy. His failure to remedy this weakness was due primarily to the success of the Allied threats leveled against the Pas-de-Calais.

"This threat, which had already proved of so much value in misleading the enemy as to the true objective of our invasion preparations, was maintained after 6 June. It served most effectively to pin down the German Fifteenth Army east of the Seine while we built up our strength in the lodgment area.

"I cannot overemphasize the decisive value of this most successful threat, which paid enormous dividends -- both at the time of the assault and during the operations of the two succeeding months.

"The German Fifteenth Army, which, if committed to battle in June or July, might possibly have defeated us by sheer weight of numbers," declared Eisenhower.

Cleveland was promoted to First Lieutenant and led his platoon behind the American breakthrough from Normandy July 25. They followed the combat elements within mobile radio range in order to relay battlefield messages to Twelfth Army Group headquarters. He now holds the rank of Major (USAR).

Author: Lindsey Williams

cutline 1 -- Photos furnished by U.S. Cleveland

[Fortitude Signal Service platoons consisted of mobile transmitters concealed under truck tarpaulins.

cutline 2

[After Operation Fortitude, U.S. Cleveland and his wireless operators kept up with the forward advance to relay battlefield messages. None of the trucks had spare tires, but the German 88-millimeter cannon had identical wheels so they were scavenged when flats occurred. Cleveland, right, and his operators remove such a tire and discover it had been taken from an American vehicle.]

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